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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Amery Garritson was arrested for resisting or obstructing Fort Hall po lice officers, and a
subsequent search of her purse revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.
Ms. Garritson asserts the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress the drug evidence
because the State failed to prove the officers had probable cause to arrest her for resisting or
obstructing an officer.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
After reviewing a surveillance video that appeared to show Casey Garritson drop a
methamphetamine pipe inside the Fort Hall Casino, Fort Hall police officer Juan Arellano
approached Mr. Garritson, and his daughter, Amery Garritson, in the outer lobby as they were
leaving the casino.

(Tr., p.6, L.9 - p.8, L.12; p.9, Ls.19-21; Ex. A: 00:00-4:29.) 1 Officer

Arellano asked Casey2 if he had dropped anything in the casino, Casey denied that he had done
so, and Officer Arellano asked him to check his pockets. (Ex. A: 4:29-4:47.) After Casey
retrieved a wallet and cash and handed them to Amery, Officer Arellano told Casey not to hand
Amery anything without his permission, said he saw surveillance footage which showed Casey
drop a pipe inside the casino, and obtained Casey's identification. (Ex. A: 4:47-5:40.) While
Officer Arellano was calling the information in to dispatch, Casey asked if he could give Amery

1

The State submitted Exhibit A, Officer Arellano' s body cam video recording of the incident,
and Exhibit B, Officer Jeremy Ball's body cam video recording of the incident, during the
suppression hearing. (Tr., p.10, L.10 - p.11, L.4; p.12, Ls.14-25; p.21, Ls.6-13.) Officer Ball
did not testify as he had been transferred to another location by the time of the hearing. (Tr., p.4,
L.18 - p.5, L.5.) Citations to Exhibits A and B will include the approximate run-time stamp of
the videos themselves, rather than the time of day the videos were taken.
2
To avoid any potential confusion, the Garritsons will be identified by their first names in this
section of this brief

1

the car keys; when Officer Arellano told him that he could not, Casey dropped the keys onto the
floor. 3 (Ex. A: 5:40-6:18.)
While awaiting a reply from dispatch, Officer Arellano told Officer Ball, another Fort
Hall officer who had arrived on the scene, to run Amery's information. (Ex. A: 8:57-9:00.)
Officer Ball asked for Amery's identification, but Amery refused to give it to him, stating that
she was not involved; Officer Ball told Amery that he needed her identification because "you are
with him, this involves drugs, and so you do have a part in it." (Ex. A: 9:00-9:45; Ex. B: 0:000:45.) Casey asked Officer Ball if Amery was being arrested or detained, and when Officer Ball
responded in the negative, Casey told Amery to walk away and leave. (Ex. A: 9-45-10: 16; Ex.
B: 0:45-1 :30.)
Despite acknow !edging that Amery was neither under arrest nor being detained, Officer
Ball followed Amery outside and again asked her for her identification, stating that he needed to
know who she was, because "this is my reservation." (Ex. B: 1:30-1 :46.) Amery eventually told
Officer Ball her first name, said she did not have her identification, and refused to answer any
other questions. (Ex. B: 1:47-2:12.) While still outside, Officer Ball told one of the casino's
private security officers that he needed to find out who Amery was because she was going to be
"kicked out" of the casino. (Ex. B: 2: 17-2:20.) Officer Ball went back into the lobby, Amery
followed him, and Officer Ball told her to step outside. (Ex. B: 2:20 - 2:39.) Casey kicked the
car keys towards Amery, and as Amery was picking up the keys, Officer Arellano told Officer
Ball to "grab those keys"; Officer Ball then grabbed Amery's arms, told her to drop the keys, and
when she did not do so, Officer Ball told her that she was being detained. (Ex. B: 2:39-2:54.)
Officer Ball then placed Amery in handcuffs and took the keys. (Ex. B: 2:54-3:30.)
3

Officer Arellano testified that Amery was not standing near him when he told Casey he could
not give his keys to Amery. (Tr., p.18, Ls.17-22.)
2

While awaiting the arrival of Bingham County sheriffs deputies, Officer Arellano took
Amery's purse from her and placed her in his patrol car. (Tr., p.29, Ls.3-17.) When the deputies
arrived, Officer Arellano told them what had occurred, and the deputies arrested Amery for
resisting or obstructing the Fort Hall officers. (Tr., p.29, L.18 - p.32, L.14.) Inside her purse,
the deputies discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. (Tr., p.24, L.2 - p.25, L.14;
p.32, L.15 -p.33, L.4.)
The State charged Amery with trafficking in methamphetamine by possessing between
28 and 200 grams of methamphetamine, possessing drug paraphernalia, and resisting or
obstructing police officers.

(R., pp.35-37.)

The State alleged that Amery committed the

resisting or obstructing charge, "by not cooperating or giving information when asked by Fort
Hall Officers." (R., p.36.)
Amery filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence found in her purse, asserting that her
"actions [did] not rise to the level of probable cause of resisting and obstructing officers," and
the search of her purse was therefore illegal. (R., pp.53-54.)4 Amery submitted an affidavit in
support of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.55-56.) Relevant to this appeal, Amery swore the
following:
4.

I tried to take the car keys so I could go and the Officer grabbed me and
told me I was not allowed to leave;

5.

I did not resist arrest or obstruct. I cooperated when I was then detained;

6.

I did not give permission to search my purse.

(R., p.55.)

4

Amery also argued that any statements she made could not be used against her, because the
officers continued to question her after she asserted her right to remain silent. (R., pp.53-54.)
Because there is no indication in the record that Amery made any incriminating statements, she
does not pursue this claim on appeal.
3

In her memorandum in support, Amery's counsel argued, "[ i]t is not resisting and
obstructing an officer for an individual to peacefully refuse to obey an officer's unlawful act."
(R., p.62 (citations omitted).) She additionally asserted that arguments and insults directed at
officers are insufficient to constitute resisting or obstructing an officer, and that she was within
(R., p.63 (citations omitted).)

her rights not to identify herself to the officers.

She further

clamed that "Officer Ball unlawfully indicated . . . that she could not pick up the keys her father
had tossed to her," and that her actions did not hinder the officers' investigation in to her father's
possession of the meth pipe. (R., p.63.) In sum, Amery's counsel asserted,
Officer Ball never allowed her any time to cooperate with a command to even
leave the keys before grabbing Amery by force and detaining her. Amery's
actions did not constitute Resisting and Obstructing and her detainment and arrest
were illegal and violated her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
(R., p.64.) Because her arrest was not supported by probable cause, Amery asserted that the

seizure and subsequent search of her purse was not justified as a search incident to arrest, and the
evidence found therein must be suppressed. (R., pp.64-66.)
The State filed a brief in opposition, arguing that although Amery had not previously
been seized by the officers, she interfered into their investigation by: "(I) refusing the lawful
command to wait outside; (2) thrice refusing the lawful command to drop the keys; (3) by
refusing the officer's first two commands to place her hands behind her back while being
detained; and (4) by physically resisting the officer's efforts to double-lock her handcuffs."
(R., pp.74-76.) The State further asserted that Amery's purse was lawfully searched either as a
valid search incident to arrest, or as an inventory search. (R., pp.77-78.)5

5

The prosecutor also asserted that, even if the court found Amery was detained prior to Officer
Ball placing his hands on her, the detention was justified pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1966). (R., pp.78-80.) However, because Officer Arellano testified that Amery had not been
4

During a hearing on Amery's motion to suppress, the State presented testimony from
Officer Arellano and submitted the body-cam videos taken from Officer Arellano and Officer
Ball. 6

(Tr., p.4, L.5 - p.21, L.14; p.28, L.23 - p.30, L.12.)

Officer Arellano offered no

testimony as to how Amery's actions purportedly obstructed their investigation, nor did he
explain what legal authority he had to prevent Amery from picking up the car keys. (Tr., p.6, L.9
- p.21, L.14; p.28, L.23 - p.30, L.9.) But when the district court asked the prosecutor how
Amery's actions obstructed the officers, the prosecutor asserted,
I would say that she obstructed their investigation in securing the scene. The
officers had instructed that the keys were not to be removed from the premises.
They were investigating Casey and his potential involvement with- with the pipe
that was dropped, and they'd instructed him not to hand off the keys.
(Tr., p.37, L.22 - p.38, L.4.) The court noted that earlier in the encounter, Officer Arellano
allowed Amery to keep the items Casey handed her, and asked the prosecutor, "Why should they
prohibit him from giving her the keys?" (Tr., p.38, Ls.6-11.) The prosecutor responded by
arguing that the officers were continuing with their investigation, and that "[i]f he arrived in a
vehicle, then there's reasonable suspicion that there might be drugs associated with the
paraphernalia that he dropped in the casino in the vehicle," and although the officers would need
a warrant in order to search the vehicle, the officers could "secure the scene until they're
complete and finished with their investigation." (Tr. p.38, L.19- p.39, L.7.)
The prosecutor acknowledged that Amery was free to leave up until the point Officer Ball
placed his hands on her and told her to drop the keys, and conceded that Amery's refusal to

detained, and because both Officer Arellano and Officer Ball specifically told her that she was
neither under arrest, nor detained prior to that point, Terry is inapplicable.
6
The State also presented testimony from Deputies Miller and Hook from the Bingham County
Sheriffs Office, who testified that Amery was arrested for resisting and obstructing the Fort Hall
officers, and that they discovered a baggie containing a substance that tested presumptively
positive for methamphetamine, and several syringes, after they searched her purse. (Tr., p.22,
L.9-p.28, L.13; p.31, L.1 -p.36, L.4.)
5

provide her name was not a basis to arrest her for resisting and obstructing the officers.
(Tr., p.39, L.8 - p.41, L.20.) Amery's counsel agreed that if the district court found there was
probable cause to arrest Amery for resisting or obstructing the officers, then suppression of the
drug evidence would not be warranted. (Tr., p.46, L.12 - p.47, L.6.) Her counsel further argued
that Amery would have assumed that she could pick up the keys that were kicked towards her,
because Officer Arellano had already let her keep the items her father handed to her earlier in the
encounter: "She just thinks she's picking up keys at that they're hers and that she can leave, and
that's really her only intent."

(Tr., p.47, L.8 - p.48, L.16.)

The prosecutor responded by

argumg,
Our basis for the obstruction is that she then walks back into the casino, is
told to stay outside because she has nothing do with it, refuses that command.
And then the keys are kicked or thrown towards the officer. Officer Ball, I
believe, states that they strike him. She grabs them. He immediately detains her at
that point and tells her to drop the keys. She refuses. He repeats that command
twice more, to my recollection. She refuses each time.
At this point he says, "Now you're being detained."
She says, ''No, I'm not."
And then she's placed into the handcuffs. That's the res1stmg and
obstructing that we're arguing is the probable cause and that that probable cause
is sufficient and, therefore, the search was valid.
(Tr., p.49, L.21 - p.50, L.10.) The court took the matter under advisement. (Tr., p.50, Ls.1315.)
The court entered a written order denying Amery's motion to suppress. (R., pp.89-106.)
The court found,
Although Amery was at liberty not to give her name to Officer Ball when asked,
she voluntarily returned to the scene where her father was being questioned.
Then, after having earlier been told not to take anything from her father,7 she
7

Neither officer told Amery that she could not take anything from her father. Instead, Officer
Arellano told Casey that he could not hand anything to Amery without his permission (Ex. A:
6

picked up the set of keys which Casey slid to her, and despite Officer Ball's
directions, refused to relinquish the keys. She never explained why she needed
the keys. Neither did she ask the officers for permission to take the keys and
drive away from the scene. Her refusal to surrender the keys despite Officer
Ball's command gave Officer Ball reasonable suspicion to detain and probable
cause to arrest her for resisting and obstructing officers.
(R., p.101.) The court continued,
Officer Ball did not violate the Fourth Amendment by asking Amery her
name and for identification. Amery clearly understood that she did not have to
give the information to Officer Ball, and she refused to do so. Despite Officer
Ball telling Amery that she was not involved and needed to leave, Amery
remained on the scene. She even re-entered the building and approached the
officers after having vehemently denied anything to do with Casey's situation.
Then, when Casey slid the keys at Amery, Amery refused to release them to
Officer Ball, despite his command to release the keys. Amery was not only free
to leave, she was asked to leave. She voluntarily re-inserted herself back into the
situation, then resisted and obstructed officers by grabbing the keys and refusing
to relinquish them upon command.
(R., p.102.) As to how Amery's actions constituted the crime of resisting or obstructing officers,
the district court held,
Amery argues that her actions did not hinder officers in their investigation
into the pipe associated with Casey. She contends that "[s]imply picking up keys
did not hinder officers in anyway," especially since she was not detained.
In a contested detention and arrest, such as occurred in this case, the level
of emotion runs high. Officers must be on constant alert to safety issues. Despite
being told earlier not to hand anything off to Amery, Casey slid his keys to her.
Amery had previously heard Arellano tell Casey not to hand anything to Amery,
but Amery nonetheless picked up the keys and refused to relinquish them.
Amery's refusal to abide by the (sic) Arellano's prior order clearly hindered the
officers' investigation of Casey by distracting the officers' attention and by
increasing Casey and Amery's tension in a moment already fraught with stress
and pressure.
(R., p.103.) The court found the subsequent search of Amery's purse was a lawful inventory
search, and therefore, the court found suppression was not warranted. (R., pp.104-05.)
4:47-6:18), a fact the district court noted later it its decision (R., p.103). This statement by the
district court appears to have been made inadvertently, but to the extent it is considered a factual
finding, this finding is clearly erroneous. See State v. Ish, 166 Idaho 492,_, 461 P.3d 774, 78283 (2020).
7

Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Amery pleaded guilty to an amended
information charging her with a possession of methamphetamine (reduced from trafficking),
preserving her right to challenge the denial of her suppression motion on appeal, and the State
dismissed the misdemeanor counts. (R., pp.109-26; Tr., p.63, L.4 - p.74, L.10.) The court
sentenced Amery to a suspended unified term of five years, with two years fixed, and placed her
on probation for a period of five years. (R., pp.148-52; Tr. p.94, L.17 - p.95, L.9.) Amery filed
a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.156-59.)

8

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Garritson's motion to suppress, because the State
failed to prove that officers had probable cause to arrest her for resisting or obstructing an
officer, and the drug evidence was discovered as a result of that unlawful arrest?

9

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Garritson's Motion To Suppress, Because The
State Failed To Prove That Officers Had Probable Cause To Arrest Her For Resisting Or
Obstructing An Officer, And The Drug Evidence Was Discovered As A Result Of That
Unlawful Arrest
A.

Introduction
The district court found that Ms. Garritson obstructed the officers when she went back

inside the Fort Hall Casino after Officer Ball told her to leave, and when she picked up the car
keys after having heard Officer Arellano tell her father not to hand her anything without his
perm1ss1on.

The court reasoned that by doing so, Ms. Garritson hindered the officers'

investigation into her father's possession of a methamphetamine pipe, by distracting the officers
and raising tensions. The district court erred because Ms. Garritson had not been detained prior
to her picking up the keys, and was therefore free to go back into the casino, and because the
State failed to provide evidence supporting its theory that the officers had the lawful authority to
prevent Ms. Garritson from picking up the car keys.

B.

The State Failed To Demonstrate The Officers Had Probable Cause To Arrest
Ms. Garritson For Resisting Or Obstructing The Officers
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right to

be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Its purpose is "to
impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials,
including law enforcement agents, in order to 'safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions."'

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)). If evidence is not seized either pursuant
to a valid warrant or pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence
discovered as a result of the illegal search or seizure must be excluded as the "fruit of the

poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). When reviewing a decision
on a motion to suppress, Idaho appellate courts "accept[] the trial court's fmdings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but freely review[] the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found." State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 414-15 (2017) (citation omitted).
The parties and the district court recognized that, if the officers had probable cause to
arrest Ms. Garritson for resisting and obstructing, the drug evidence found in her purse would not
be subject to suppression; however, if the State failed to prove the officers had probable cause,
suppression would be warranted. (Tr., p.36, L.21 - p.50, L.15.) Idaho Code§ 18-705 defines
resisting or obstructing officers as follows:
Every person who wilfully resists, delays or obstructs any public officer, in the
discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office or who knowingly
gives a false report to any peace officer, when no other punishment is prescribed,
is punishable by a fme not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year.
"Duty," as used in this section, "encompass[es] only those lawful and authorized acts of a public
officer." State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 180 (Ct. App. 1988), ajf'd State v. Wilkerson, 115
Idaho 357 (1988). Thus, "where an individual refuses to obey an order or obstructs an act of a
public officer which is contrary to the law, be it statute or constitution, that individual does not
violate LC. § 18-705." Id.
The ultimate question in this appeal, therefore, is whether Ms. Garritson disobeyed any
instructions from the officers, given within the scope of their lawful duties.

During the

suppression hearing, the State asserted that Ms. Garritson violated this statute by re-entering the
casino after Officer Ball told her to leave, by picking up the car keys after hearing Officer
Arellano tell her father he could not give the keys to her, and by failing to immediately drop the

11

car keys when Officer Ball told her to do so.

(Tr., p.49, L.21-10.)

The State failed to

demonstrate that any of these orders were given within the scope of the officers' lawful duties.

1.

Officer Ball Did Not Have The Lawful Authority To Order Ms. Garritson To
Leave The Fort Hall Casino

The State recognized that Ms. Garritson had neither been arrested nor detained when
Officer Ball told her to leave the casino. (Tr., p.41, Ls.10-20.) As such, Ms. Garritson was
under no obligation to obey Officer Ball's command and was free to go about her business,
including walking back into the casino. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
The court found that Officer Ball instructed casino security personnel that Ms. Garritson was "to
be trespassed from the casino."

(R., p.76.)

However, despite Officer Ball's braggadocious

proclamation that Ms. Garritson was on his reservation (Ex. B: 1:30-1 :46), neither the
reservation, nor the Fort Hall Casino belonged to Officer Ball, and he had no lawful authority to
trespass her from that business.

See I.C. § 18-7008(2)(a) (describing criminal trespass as

occurring, in relevant part, when a person "fails to depart immediately from the real property of
another after being notified by the owner or his agent to do so")). Officer Ball was a federal law
enforcement officer, not the owner or agent of the Fort Hall Casino, and he had no lawful
authority to bar Ms. Garritson from re-entering the casino. 8 Thus, because Officer Ball did not
have the lawful authority to order Ms. Garritson not to re-enter the casino, her re-entry did not
provide the officers with probable cause to arrest her for resisting or obstructing.

8

Notably, Officer Arellano told the Garritsons, "I don't work here." (Ex. A: 6:48-6:49)
12

2.

The State Failed To Demonstrate The Officers Had The Lawful Authority To
Prevent Ms. Garritson From Picking Up The Car Keys

The State also failed to show the officers had the lawful authority to prevent
Ms. Garritson from picking up the keys. To be clear, the State did not assert that the keys
themselves were contraband and therefore subject to seizure. Presumably, had Officer Arellano
believed the keys to be contraband, he would have seized them himself Instead, the prosecutor
argued to the district court that the officers had the lawful authority to seize the vehicle the
Garritsons had arrived in, claiming "there's reasonable suspicion that there might be drugs
associated with the paraphernalia that he dropped in the casino in that vehicle," and that, while
the officers needed a warrant to search the vehicle, they could "secure the scene until they're
complete and finished with their investigation." (Tr., p.38, L.19 - p.39, L.7.) This assertion is
supported neither in law, nor in fact.
The State provided no legal authority for its claim that Casey Garritson' s lawful seizure
inside the casino, provided the officers the authority to seize the vehicle in which he had arrived.
This was not a traffic stop, in which seizing a vehicle is a necessary function of seizing an
individual inside the vehicle, who is suspected of having committed a crime. See, e.g., United

States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226
(1985). Nor was this a circumstance in which, based upon his possession of a methamphetamine
pipe, Mr. Garritson fit the profile of a drug courier using his vehicle to transport illegal drugs,
justifying the temporary seizure of both Mr. Garritson and the vehicle. See, e.g., Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983). Further, the State did not claim the officers had probable cause
to search the vehicle by the time Officer Ball ordered Ms. Garritson to drop the keys. (Tr., p.38,
L.19 - p.39, L.7.)

13

Additionally, the plain view exception does not support the prosecutor's assertion,
because the officers had not viewed the vehicle by the time Officer Ball detained Ms. Garritson.
The Idaho Supreme Court described the parameters of the plain view exception in State v. Ruck,
155 Idaho 475 (2013). "If, during a lawful search of a private area, an officer sees an object in
plain view, the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent, and the officer has
a lawful right to access the object, the officer may seize it." Id. at 482 (citing Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990)). "The officer must have probable cause to believe that

the object is evidence of a crime or contraband." Id. (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,
326-27 (1987)). While the officers undoubtedly had the lawful authority to look through the
windows of the Garritson's vehicle while it was in the casino's parking lot, and could have
searched the vehicle without a warrant if they saw contraband, see United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982), the prosecutor's argument to the district court put the cart before the horse. The
officer had no lawful authority to first seize the vehicle, and then determine whether there was
probable cause to search it; instead, absent probable cause to believe the vehicle contained
contraband, the officers had no lawful authority to justify its seizure in the first place. See Ruck,
155 Idaho at 482.
Furthermore, the State offered no factual support for its unasserted exception to the
warrant requirement. Officer Arellano did not testify that he either intended to seize the vehicle,
or that he suspected the vehicle contained contraband. (Tr., p.6, L.9 - p.21, L.14; p.28, L.23 30, L.9.) He did not explain how, in his training and experience, a person who drops a meth pipe
on the floor of the casino probably has drugs in their vehicle. Id. This argument was simply a
post hoc justification for the officers' actions, offered by the prosecutor after failing to elicit any
such testimony from Officer Arellano. The State's failure to offer a factual basis in support of its
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purported legal justification for seizing the Garritson's vehicle demonstrates the officers had no
legal justification for either seizing the keys, or preventing Ms. Garritson from retrieving them.
Thus, the State failed to prove the officers had probable cause to arrest Ms. Garritson for
resisting or obstructing, based upon her picking up the keys.

3.

Ms. Garritson Did Not Commit The Crime Of Resisting Or Obstructing By Not
Complying With Officer's Ball's Orders That She Drop The Keys

For the reasons stated above, the officers did not have the lawful authority to seize the
keys. Therefore, Officer Ball had no lawful authority to order Ms. Garritson to drop the keys.
Ms. Garritson's passive refusal to drop the keys did not provide the officers with probable cause
to arrest her for resisting or obstructing an officer.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Garritson's Motion To Suppress
The district court did not find that Ms. Garritson's act of picking up the keys and refusing

to immediately let go of them interfered with the officers' ability to seize the vehicle; instead, the
court found her actions "clearly hindered the officers' investigation of Casey by districting the
officers' attention and by increasing Casey and Amery's tension in a moment already fraught
with stress and pressure." (R., p.103.) It is quite possible that Ms. Garritson's refusal to abide
the officers' unlawful orders distracted them and raised tensions; however, this does not mean
Ms. Garritson resisted or obstructed the officers.
The Wilkerson Court held, "where an individual refuses to obey an order or obstructs an
act of a public officer which is contrary to the law, be it statute or constitution, that individual
does not violate LC.§ 18-705." 114 Idaho at 180. Undoubtedly, officers are often distracted by
people they encounter expressing an understanding of their Fourth Amendment rights, and a
person's refusal to comply with an officer's unlawful request is surely tension-raising.
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But

peacefully refusing to obey an unlawful order from an officer is not a crime in Idaho, and doing
so does not provide officers with probable cause to arrest the person for resisting or obstructing,
no matter how intense or distracting the refusal may be.
The officers did not have the lawful authority to prevent Ms. Garritson from re-entering
the casino, and did not have the lawful authority to prevent her from picking up the car keys.
Therefore, the State failed to demonstrate the officers had probable cause to arrest Ms. Garritson
for resisting or obstructing the officers, and the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Garritson respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction, reverse the
order denying her motion to suppress, and remand her case to the district court with instructions
to dismiss the charges against her.
DATED this 22 nd day of December, 2020.
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